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JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT: POLITICAL QUESTIONS
AND MALAPPORTIONMENT
STEPHEN I. MTCHELL*

I
Justice Felix Frankfurter, dissenting in the Tennessee Reapportionment Case,' characterized the holding of that decision as "a massive
repudiation of the experience of our whole past."' Whether or not this
is true we may presently discover, but in the meanwhile Baker v. Carr
may safely be described as a truly momentous constitutional decision.
Without wishing to labor the obvious, legislative apportionment can
be a violently partisan problem which, in the normal course of things,
we might expect the Court to bend every effort to avoid. It is an area
in which judicial standards are elusive and in which judicial remedies
could be hard to apply and easy to avoid. The Court could have
easily avoided the decision in Baker by adhering to a line of contrary
precedents, but it chose instead to abandon an excellent defensive
position in favor of a more active judicial role. I do not presume to
pass on the wisdom of that choice, but more narrowly to inquire
whether it was, in fact, the "massive repudiation" described by the
venerable Justice.
Time and space do not permit an examination of the whole doctrine
of judicial self-restraint. This work is concerned more narrowly with
that aspect of judicial self-restraint most germane to Baker v. Carr,
the doctrine of "political questions."
II
The term "political question" as a sub-category of the so-called
"non-justiciable question" seems to describe a battery of questions
upon which courts, for one reason or another, refuse to rule. Attempts
at precise definition have been spectacularly unproductive. A political
question, wrote Edward S. Corwin, relates "to the possession of political power, of sovereignty, of government, the determination of
which is vested in Congress and the President, [and] whose decisions
are conclusive upon the courts." 3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted that political questions are such as have
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Washington State University.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 Id. at 267.
8 CoRwIN, THE CoNsrvunox oF THE UNiT STATEs oF ALIERacA 547 (1953).
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been entrusted by the sovereign for decision to the so-called political
departments for government, as distinguished from questions which
the sovereign has set to be decided by courts.' Justice Holmes regarded such definitions as "little more than a play upon words," 5 and
Professor Roche put it this way: "A juridical definition of the term is
impossible, for at root the logic that supports it is circular: political
questions are matters not soluble by the judicial process; matters not
soluble by the judicial process are political questions. As an early
dictionary explained, violins are small cellos, and cellos are large
violins." 6
Less pungently, but in the same vein, political question are "those
which judges choose not to decide, and a question becomes political by
the judge's refusal to decide it."' Unless we are prepared to accept
these kinds of definitions, it might be more illuminating to examine the
kinds of questions courts have declined to answer by reason of the fact
they were political in nature. There seem to be four general categories,
but some overlapping will be inevitable.
First, courts have declined jurisdiction under circumstances which
pleaded the necessity for a prompt and final announcement of a single,
uniform policy. There are questions, as Justice Brennan suggested in
Baker, that "uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views."' The best examples here would come from the field of
foreign relations, and would include questions directed at the recognition of foreign governments,9 the determination of when hostilities began and ceased,1" and similar problems." Some questions have required uniformity, others have argued the need for finality of judgement. John P. Frank has suggested, for example, that "it would be
calamitous to have the validity of constitutional amendments brought
2
into serious question long after their promulgation.""l
4 Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
5 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).
6Roche, JudicialSelf-Restraint,44 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 762, 768 (1955).
7 PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 10 (1955).

8 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
1 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
10 See the Court's statement in Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57

(1923).
11 In Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1940), the court compiled a list of
such questions which included the recognition of foreign governments; conditions of
peace and war; the beginning and end of war; whether aliens should be excluded or
deported; government title to or jurisdiction over territory; enforcement of treaties;
and constitutional powers of representatives of foreign nations. Id. at 33-34.
12 Frank, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAw 38 (Cahn ed.

1954).
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A second category of questions has involved problems clearly committed for solution to one of the other branches of government. Congress, for example, is the sole judge of the qualifications of its own
members;"8 the duty to see to it that the laws are faithfully enforced
cannot be brought under legal compulsion;'" and interstate rendition
cannot be judicially enforced. 5 As Justice Frankfurter noted in Colegrove v. Green: "The Constitution has left the performance of many
duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the
people in exercising their political rights."'
A third area has seen jurisdiction declined for what is generally
called "judicial incompetence," i.e., an unwillingness to reach the merits where the solution required information not readily available to
judges, as in Coleman v. Miller,"' or in those cases where only some
other branch of government could provide a solution. The best example of the latter, Colegrove v. Green,'8 has been somewhat impaired.
Finally, the doctrine of political questions has been invoked where
a decision on the merits would result in unenforceable orders, or decrees which would be the focal point for widespread public dislike, or
even public violence. One of the standard works on political questions
suggests, for example, that Chief Justice John Marshall cast the
status of Indian Tribes as such a question because he was certain
that neither Georgia nor President Jackson would permit judicial solution of the Cherokee question. 9 As a further example, armed conflict
might have resulted from Supreme Court intervention in Luther v.
Borden n
Dennis v. United States, 171 F2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
"4
Mississippi v. Johnson, 70 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
5
1 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
16 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
'7 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Mr. Chief justice Hughes, speaking for the Court, indicated
that solution would require "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic, vhich can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range
of evidence receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would be an extravagant
extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice... "' Id. at 453.
18 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Mr. Justice Frankfurter's assertion here was that "no court
can affirmatively re-map the Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity
with the standards of fairness for a representative system. At best we could only declare the existing electoral system invalid." Id. at 553. An excellent alternative
example covering both aspects is Chicago & Southern Airlines Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
19 PosT, THE SuPREa COURT AND POLITIcAL QuEsTioNs 98-124 (1936).
20 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). There was at the time an insurrection (Dorr's
13

Rebellion) in the State, which could have broken out into civil war. It is obvious,

however, that these concerns have not prevented the Court from accepting explosive
cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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There are other and perhaps more useful methods of classifying the
kinds of issues known as political questions, but this will serve to open
the problem for discussion. The political question doctrine seems
more rational and understandable when approached case by case. The
general definitions are not very satisfactory, and it makes little sense
to apply the doctrine to a list of "untouchable subjects" in the absence
of compelling functional reasons for so doing.
III
Coming more directly to the theme of this article, what of political
questions and legislative reapportionment? With respect to the state
courts, the situation is confused. In a recent monograph, Professor
Gordon Baker noted that: "In spite of this long established precedent
[referring to Colgrove v. Green] there is clearly a trend away from
judicial non-interference. The general ferment in American jurisprudence which has re-examined other supposedly established doctrines
appears to have touched the area of state legislative reapportionment."" So far as the state courts are concerned, this may have been
a little strong. Because the state courts are not bound by the statement
of judicial power in Article III, many of these tribunals have had the
opportunity to develop broader standards of justiciability than could
formerly have been found in the federal courts.2 2 But while there have
been numerous attempts to involve state judicial systems in reapportionment problems, few of these have been successful. The state courts
have held many times that legislatures had a duty and an obligation
to reapportion themselves, but they have also nearly always found that
the requirement was not judicially enforceable.2
The early Twentieth Century reform movements brought a number
of apportionment suits to the state courts, but these were by and
21 BAKER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS:

22

REAPPORTIONMENT 51

(1960).

Note, for example, the broad powers exercised by the courts in Virginia annexation questions. See Bain, Annexation: Virginia's Not-So-Judicial System, 15 PuB.
ADMIN. REv. 251 (1955).
23 For example, the so-called Suffolk County Cases involved action against the
county officials and not the legislature: Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 224 Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916); Donovan v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Comm'rs, 225 Mass. 55, 113 N.E. 740 (1916); Brohpy v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Comm'rs, 225 Mass. 124, 113 N.E. 1040 (1916). In these cases
the courts twice invalidated the legislative districts and twice directed the writ of mandamus to the county officials. Having reduced the population disparity from a little
better than 3-1 to a little less than 2-1, the court declined to invalidate and mandamus
a third time. See also the Fergus Cases: Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557
(1926) ; Fergus v. Kinney, 333 Il1. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928) ; People ex rel. Fergus v.
Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930). These represented unsuccessful attempts
to obtain a petition to mandamus the legislature, to enjoin the payment of legislative
salaries, and to obtain quo warranto process against legislators.
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large unsuccessful actions. There were some limited remedies available
in a few states, but in the whole history of the reapportionment problem in the state courts there does not appear to be a single state decision in which a judicial order was given to a legislature to reapportion.
In the often-cited Suffolk County Cases" ' in Massachusetts, the writ of
mandamus lay to the county commissioners and not to the legislature.
In the more recent Oregon decision,25 the Court's order was issued to
the Secretary of State under procedure provided for in the state constitution.
However open the question of judicial intervention may have been
prior to 1946,20 the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Colegrove v. Green 7 was quite generally applied by the state courts to
their own situations. A number of these tribunals declined jurisdiction
in apportionment cases on the ground that such questions were nonjusticiable under the Colegrove rule. There were, however, some exceptions. High courts in three states did assume jurisidiction of apportionment questions, but affirmative relief was denied. 9 In at least one
state case jurisdiction was taken and a decision on the merits postponed in order to give the legislature a chance to act. 0 Instances of
affirmative state court action have been rare since Colegrove; other
than the Oregon decision s ' mentioned above, the only notable judicial
action occurred in Arkansas in 1952. There the Arkansas Supreme
Court apportioned that state itself after an apportioning board had
failed to act. 2
It is difficult to assess the impact of the state decisions on the justiciability of apportionment questions, but a few generalizations might
24

Cited in note 23 supra.

25 In re Apportionment of Senators and Representatives, 228 Ore. 575, 365 P2d 1042
(1961). Oregon is one of the six states that provide for an alternative commission or

executive official to act if the legislature does not. The others are California, Illinois,
Michigan, South Dakota, and Texas.
26 Although the position that courts could not afford relief in such cases seems strong.

See Annot, 2 A.L.R. 1134 (1919) and 46 A.L.R. 964 (1927).
27
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
28
The leading examples are Waid v. Pool, 255 Ala. 441, 51 So.2d 869 (1951);
Romang v. Cordell, 206 Okla. 369, 243 P.2d 677 (1952) ; Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1,
104 N.W2d 63 (1960) ; Barnes v. Barnett, 241 Miss. 206,129 So2d 638 (1961) ; Butcher
v. Rice, 397 Pa. 158, 153 A-2d 869 (1959) ; Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292
S.W2d 40 (1956); and State ex rel. Broughton v. Zimmerman, 261 Wis. 398,52 N.W. 2d
9032 (1952).
D Brewer v. Gray, 86 So2d 799 (Fla. 1956) ; State v. Meyers, 51 Wn2d 454, 319
P2d 828 (1957) ; State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416

(1953).
30
Asbury Park Press Inc. v. Woolley, 33 NJ. 1, 161 A2d 705 (1960).
31
In re Apportionment of Senators and Representatives, 228 Ore. 575, 365 P2d 1042
(1961).
3
2 Pickens v. Board of Apportionment, 220 Ark. 145,246 S.W.2d 556 (1952).
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be offered. First, in spite of the potentially broader standards of justiciability available to the state courts, the great weight of precedent in
those courts has supported the view that apportionment questions are
inappropriate subjects for the judicial power." Second, the state decisions were not nearly as helpful as they might have been, since they
rarely contained any kind of precise discussion of either standing or
justiciability, the most common kind of disposition being on simple
separation of powers reasoning. Finally, even where the state courts
have afforded some kind of relief, the remedies have been limited and
unimaginative. No state court has ordered a legislature to reapportion,
and no state court has ordered an at-large election. 4 Most of the
remedies accomplished by mandamus have come under explicit provision of the state constitution, further reducing the area of judicial
innovation. There does not appear to have been a trend away from
the older state court view that courts could not afford relief in apportionment questions.
IV
Turning to the federal cases, a somewhat different pattern emerges.
The litigation began in earnest in the 1930's, reflecting the dislocations
caused by the population increase during the previous decade. The
population of the United States increased by 17,000,000 during this
period, and after the decennial census in 1930, fully two-thirds of the
states found their representation affected by the ensuing congressional
reapportionment. The problem apparently was not as severe for those
states which gained representation, for of the five decisions which
reached the Supreme Court as a result of the 1932 apportionment, only
one came from such a state. 5 The other four cases 8 came from states
which had lost representation and thus faced the prospect of complete
at-large elections if they failed to reapportion.
3- See Walter, Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts,37 ILL. L. Rv. 20, 23
(1942).
3
4 A possible exception is Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932), where
a mandamus was obtained to compel the Secretary of State to accept the at-large filings
of the congressional delegation.
85 Koenig v. Flynn, 258 N.Y. 292, 179 N.E. 705 (1932). New York gained two seats
for a total of 45. States which gained representation but which did not redistrict simply
elected the additional representatives at large. New York was one of the States which
did redistrict, the suit here challenging the validity of the legislature's redistricting by
concurrent resolution.
36 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), reversing 184 Minn. 228, 238 N.W 494
(1931); Carrol v. Becker, 329 Mo. 501, 45 S.W.2d 533 (1932), affirmed, 285 U.S. 380
(1932); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932), reversing 1 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Miss.
1932); and Mahon v. Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932), reversing 1 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky.
1932).
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The two most significant cases here were Smiley v. Holm,"7 a case
from Minnesota, and Wood v. Broom, 8 which came from a federal district court in Mississippi. In Smiley v. Holm, a citizen, elector, and
taxpayer of the State sought a declaration of invalidity for a reapportionment statute, as well as an injunction against its use, on two
grounds. First, he argued that since the Governor had vetoed the redistricting act, and since the legislature had not re-passed the act over
his veto, any use of the act was improper. He further urged the argument that the act was invalid because it did not follow the standards of
compactness, contiguity, and population equality laid down by the
Federal Reapportionment Act of 1911 .1 The Minnesota Supreme
Court dismissed the complaint holding, as to the first point, that redistricting was not a normal legislative act and that the gubernatorial
veto did not apply. With regard to the second point, the Minnesota
court held that the Act of 1911 had expired, and that even if it had
been in force, the question was non-justiciable. 0 On review, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, confining its holding to the first point
raised. Legislative redistricting, said the Court, was not of a sufficiently
special character so as to be immune from the veto power. It was thus
unnecessary to reach the question concerning the 1911 Act. The two
other cases involving the validity of the veto were disposed of on the
same grounds.41
The precedent value of Smiley v. Holm might well be argued. Mr.
Justice Rutledge assumed that Smiley stood for the proposition that
"This Court has power to afford relief in a case of this type as against
the objection that the issues are not justiciable."" Justice Brennan,
in Baker, read Smiley as a decision on the merits without qualification
or restriction.4 3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, took the
view that Smiley v. Holm was distinguishable as a case in which the
Supreme Court had simply "released state constitutional provisions
prescribing local lawmaking procedures from misconceived restriction
of superior federal requirements."" In Smiley the Court had hinted,
however tentatively, that the ultimate remedy in such cases lay with
39 Chapter 5, 37 Stat. 13 (1911).
37 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
40 184 Minn. 228, 238 N.W. 494 (1931).
38 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
41 The other cases were Carrol v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932) ; and Koenig v. Flynn,
285 U.S. 375 (1932). In these cases, as well as in Smiley, the Court tentatively suggested the appropriateness of at-large elections should the legislature not respond with
speed to the veto.
sufficient
42
Concurring in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 565 (1946).
43 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962).
44 Id. at 285.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vor- 39

Congress.45 But the Court also hinted that it was not considering the
Act of 1911 because of the disposition of the case on the veto question,
the possible inference being that the Court had power to treat the issue
had it not been otherwise disposed of."8 Whatever its full meaning,
Smiley at least undercut somewhat the premise that apportionment
questions are, by their very nature, insoluble by judicial means.
The next landmark in the struggle to bring apportionment questions
under the rubric of judicial power was a decision from a federal district
court in Mississippi, Wood v. Broom.4 7 Here the Court was faced with
the question it had been able to avoid in Smiley, the validity and applicability of the standards contained in the 1911 Federal Apportionment Statute. Wood involved review of a permanent injuncion, granted
by a three-judge court, restraining state officers from conducting a
congressional election under a Mississippi redistricting act. Previous
federal apportionment statutes had set forth certain standards,4 8 but
these were not specifically carried over in the Apportionment Act of
1929." 9 The plaintiffs in Wood argued that, in spite of the omission,
the states were to be districted under the terms of the 1911 Act, and
the district court took that view. The Supreme Court, however, held
that the omission of standards in the 1929 Act was deliberate, and that
the requirements of the earlier Acts were repealed. The district court
was thus without power to disturb the state's action.'
As was the case with Smiley, the precedent value of Wood is at best
questionable. Hughes' opinion suggested that the Court would have
had jurisdiction if the Act of 1911 had not expired, but a four-man
minority would have dismissed the suit for "want of equity,"'" whatever that may have meant. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court
in Baker v. Carr, found Wood among "an unbroken line of our precedents [sustaining] the federal courts' jurisdiction of the subject matter
of federal constitutional claims of this nature."5 2 The Court, he said,
45 See 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932).
46 Id. at 375.
47 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
48 The first statute, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1842), required the States to elect their
Representatives from single-member districts hewn from contiguous territory. The Acts
of 1901, ch. 93, 31 Stat. 733 and 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13, added the requirement of compactness. The 1929 Act, 46 Stat. 26 (1929), 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1958), omitted all references to compactness, contiguity and equality of population.
49 As a matter of fact, the 1929 version did not even require that the States be divided
into districts. See 46 Stat. 26 (1929), 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1958).
50 287 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1932). The same result was reached in Mahan v. Hume, 287 U.S.
575 (1932).
51 Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Roberts, and Stone. 287 U.S. 1, 8 (1937).
52 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962).
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"reviewed the federal question on the merits and reversed the District
Court."58 Neither of the dissenting Justices in Baker v. Carr could
make any use of the case." Again, as with Siley, perhaps the best
thing that could be said for Wood v. Broom is that it cast some small
doubt on the idea that courts had universally regarded apportionment
issues as non-justiciable.
All of this set a rather uncertain stage for the case that was to become the major stumbling block in the malapportionment problem,
Colegrove v. Green.5 It seems correct to say that some state courts,"
some lower federal courts,57 and the United States Supreme Court 8
itself have taken jurisidiction of malapportionment cases. Courts at all
levels have declined many more of such suits than they have accepted, 9 and instances of effective relief have been rare, but these statements do not alter the fact that precedents do exist for judicial intervention in apportionment difficulties.
The courts have been presented with three possible courses of action.
First, they could have concluded that they lacked power, i.e., jurisidiction, to entertain such cases. The rationale in the congressional districting cases would rest on the ground that the problem was committed to Congress, and that the courts could not act without specific
Congressional mandate. As for the state legislative districts, the courts
could have concluded that the Equal Protection clause was not selfexecuting in this area. The second possibility was that the courts
could find that there existed substantive federal standards, in either
the Constitution or statutes, that were self-executing, but that the
Court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction for reasons of
sound public policy. The third alternative was, of course, that the
courts had jurisdiction and that they ought to exercise it. A survey of
the cases indicates that there has been little support for the first possibility, and by the time of Colegrove we seem, sub silentio, to have conceded that courts have jurisdiction. The argument then could turn on
whether or not the courts should exercise it in this kind of dispute. It
was with respect to this question that Colegrove v. Green had the
greatest impact.
53Ibid.
UJustice Frankfurter included Wood v. Broom in an historical note, without comment: 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962). Justice Harlan did not mention it at all.
55
5 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
6See text accompanying notes 23, 25, 29-32, 35 supra.
57 See cases cited note 36 supra.
ri See text accompanying notes 35 and 36 supra.
69 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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V

A few salient points need to be made with respect to Colegrove. It
involved a suit to restrain further use of Illinois' congressional districts, last malaportioned in 1901, on the ground that the inequality of
population among the districts violated Article I and the Fourteenth
Amendment. A three-judge district court dismissed on the authority of
Wood v. Broom. The Supreme Court, a "bob-tailed" court, as Justice
Clark called it,"0 split four to three in affirming the lower courts' decision, and three-one-three in its reasoning. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion, in which Reed and Burton joined, was a rather curious judicial exercise. Frankfurter asserted that the Court could dispose of the
case after the fashion of the district court, but that he also agreed
with the "want of equity" reasoning urged by Brandeis in Wood v.
Broom. He took further refuge in language suggestive of a lack of
standing, the presumptions of the political question doctrine, an unwillingness to alter the delicate federal-state balance, and the absence
of a realistic judicial remedy. More importantly, he made what might
safely be called a "sound public policy" argument. "Courts," Justice
Frankfurter said in that famed phrase, "ought not to enter this political
thicket."'"
Justice Rutledge, who joined Justices Frankfurter, Reed, and Burton in the disposition of the case, clearly felt that the Court had jurisdiction of the problem, but that the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction on policy grounds. The cure, he said, was worse than the
disease. Justice Black, joined by Douglas and Murphy, dissented on
the ground that the Court was possessed of jurisdiction, and that it
ought to use it.
Where then, did the decision in Colegrove really rest? It seems
clear, to begin with, that a minimum of four Justices6" took the position that the Court had jurisdiction of the problem, although Justice
Rutledge was unwilling to exercise it. Moreover, if those portions of
Frankfurter's plurality opinion which dealt with "want of equity" and
the "political thicket" are taken at face value, all seven members of
the Court admitted to having jurisdiction, splitting then four-to-three
on the wisdom of exercising it. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court have tended to support this view. In South v. Peters, 6 for ex60 Concurring in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 252 (1962).

U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
62 I.e., Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge.
63 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
61328
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ample, the Supreme Court dismissed a challenge of Georgia's county
unit system with a single sentence: "Federal courts consistently refuse to excercise their equity powers in cases posing political issues
arising from a state's geographic distribution of electoral strength
among its political subdivisions."" It has been suggested that "This
language concedes jurisdiction but finds a policy basis for not acting.""
Further support might be drawn from MacDougall v. Green,"6 a case
which dealt with the geographical dispersion of signatures on nominating petitions. The Court must have assumed that such questions
were justiciable, since it went on to sustain the requirements in a per
curiam opinion."
VI
There remains only the "dragon in the thicket,"6 Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,69 and a consideration of the extent to which it constituted a
bridge between Colegrove and Baker. While it would be stretching
matters to say that Gomillion clearly signalled the Court's shift in
Baker v. Carr it did stand out sufficiently from the mainstream of
cases to attract attention and even speculation. No doubt many students of constitutional law experienced a visceral twinge or two as they
read Gomillion, but some of them may have been briefly comforted by
Jo Desha Lucas' analysis. "It is quite possible... ," he said, "that in
the 1961 Term, when Baker v. Carr and Scholle v. Secretary of State
force a reexamination of the Court's refusal to undertake the general
job of pruning, the Justices will remember the thorns they encountered
7
in the thicket of the Tuskeegee dragon hunt." '
There were a number of factors in the Tuskeegee case that invited
careful attention from those who chart the vagaries of Supreme Court
doctrines, but the most intriguing aspect for present purposes was the
Court's handling of the malapportionment precedents. These were
61Id. at 277.

65 Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution,27 LAw
TEMP. PROB. 329, 345 (1962).
66335 U.S. 281 (1948).
67 Note, however, that a number of apportionment suits from the federal

& Cox-

district
courts were dismissed per curiam in the interval between Colegrove and Baker. Turman
v. Duckworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) ; Cook v. Fortsom, 329 U.S. 675 (1946) ; Colegrove
v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947) ; Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952) ; and Radford
v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957). A district court had also dismissed Baker v. Carr. 179
F. 68
Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomnillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 SurrzEmE CouRT RLv. 194.
69
364
U.S. 339 (1960).
70
Lucas, sutpranote 68, at 244.
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distinguished, it will be recalled, on the ground that they involved mere
dilution of the vote rather than the loss of it. This could have been
interpreted as an attempt to gloss over a disagreement among the Justices as to the validity of the holding in Colegrove, thus foreshadowing
a reappraisal of the apportionment question in a proper case. The
Court's elaborately careful disposition of the issue on fifteenth rather
than fourteenth amendment grounds did little to dispel the uneasiness.
It was true that Gomillion was easily distinguishable from the malapportionment cases on at least two major grounds, the presence of
the racial factor and the existence of a feasible remedy, but the
racial gerrymander involved presented the Supreme Court with a
unique opportunity to distinguish the apportionment cases in such a
way as to foreclose immediate further consideration. The Court's
failure to do so presaged, at least to a limited extent, the decision in
Baker v. Carr.
VII
Coming a full circle, to what extent has the Court's decision to accept Baker v. Carr affected the doctrine of justiciability and political
questions? It would seem fair to say that they will never be the same
again. It seems clear that the court will no longer operate in terms of
category of "untouchable subjects" beyond the scope of judicial power.
It has adopted instead what it called a "case-by-case inquiry,"'" the
implication being that even those elements retained as a valid core of
the political question doctrine are rebuttable in individual cases. 2 As
to the effect of this on future decisions, we will simply have to wait and
see. If Baker v. Carr is to serve as the model for the future disposition
of political question cases, the doctrine will lose much of its vitality.
The bulk of this article has been directed at the twin problems of
jurisdiction and justiciability, and a good case can be made for the
position that neither state nor federal precedents had foreclosed the
possibility of granting jurisdiction. In this sense, Baker v. Carr did
not involve the "massive repudiation" attributed to it by Justice
Frankfurter. As a matter of fact, Frankfurter himself admitted that
the district court had jurisdiction of the malapportionment claim. 3 Of
all the Justices only Harlan contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction.74
71369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
72 These elements are summarized, Id. at 217.
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Jurisdiction, however, implies only the power to look, without prejudice to the merits. Having looked, a court might conclude that it
lacked facts or standards or remedies and, on the basis of this, decline
to attempt relief on the merits. Justiciability, on the other hand, seems
to imply a decision on the merits; the case is accepted, and after a consideration of the complaint and the available remedies, the court condudes that it cannot offer any relief. The difficulty is that few of the
opinions prior to Colegrove made any real distinction between jurisdiction and justiciability. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to draw
from the mass of precedent any kind of clear-cut rule. The district
court in Baker v. Carr, for instance, indicated that it considered all
the apportionment cases beginning with Colegrove to dictate a rule
of judicial non-intervention, "whether from a lack of jurisdicition or
from the inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consider75
ation."
If the judicial past were as conclusive on this question as Frankfurter asserted it was in Baker, then the Tennessee district court ought
to have had some clearer notion as to what it was about. It is difficult
to assent to the notion that there was any "massive repudiation" present in the justiciability question. Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove
seems to say that legislative apportionment among geographic areas
within a state is a political question beyond the cognizance of the
courts. But a majority of the Court in Colegrove did not accept that
view, and it cannot be reconciled with either of the two bracketing
decisions, Smiley v. Holm"' or MacDougall v. Green."
Baker v. Carr will not shed much light on the question of jurisdiction. The Court's handling of the problem was brutally short in the
essentials, even though the discussion carried through five pages."8
Justice Brennan seemed to say that the barest allegation of a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment would suffice. The complaint in Baker
had "alleged" the violation: "Dismissal of the complaint upon the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter would, therefore, be
justified only if that claim were 'so attenuated and unsubstantial as to
be absolutely devoid of merit,'..."'I This is liable to have the effect of
letting nearly all litigants past the judicial threshold. It would have
75179
76 285
77 335
78 369
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U.S. 281 (1948). Decided after Colegrov.
U.S. 186, 199-204 (1962).
79 Id.at 199.
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the advantage, however, of permitting an examination of justiciability
by a full court on the merits, and would preclude the possibility of
denying jurisdiction on the ground that the question was non-justiciable.
If Baker did little to illuminate the problem of jurisdiction, it may
have done even less with justiciability. Brennan's main concern was to
distinguish an unfavorable line of precedent. He offered no compelling
reasons for the Court's new position on the justiciability of apportionment questions, and he failed to consider two important factors that
have been at the heart of political questions reasoning since its emergence as a canon of judicial self-restraint, namely the absence of
meaningful federal standards and the absence of appropriate and feasible remedies.
As for standards, Brennan disposed of the matter with a flick of the
pen: "Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular
facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply
arbitrary and capricious action."80 As to remedies, Baker was remanded "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."'" But
neither Baker, nor any other federal opinion, has ever systematically
examined the scope of a federal court's remedial power, let alone contained a discussion of how to bring about state action in a field committed to state authority.
In a very real sense, Baker v. Carr did not so much destroy or impair the political question doctrine as it did to ignore it. If this marked
the end of its usefulness as a canon of self-restraint, a more ignoble
death cannot be imagined.

80 Id. at 226.

81 Id. at 237.

